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THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
TACK ALL]:;t' ULoUN, et al.' 
JS. 
Plaintitfs-
Res[.>ondents, 
Sl1LT LAKE CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT,) 
et al., ) Case No. 19055 
) 
Uef endants- ) 
Appellants. ) 
* * * * * * * 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal arises from an action for injunctive 
rel1et and retund of property taxes paid under protest, predi-
tea on appellants' adoption of a budget for the Salt Lake 
C1 ty School D1str ict containing a reserve used to meet unex-
tJeei_ed contingency expenditures not otherwise provided for by 
1c accounts in the budget, and which reserve was in addi-
t1on to that reserve authorized by Utah Code Ann. § 53-20-2 
UlSPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
'It1P 1ndtter was tried on January 20, 1983. The trial 
- , _,,_,,.J J ud-c1rnent to res[.>onoents and entered an order of 
''I .111 l Tne trial court reserved the issue of 
'' '' ,_,,\ s' e11t1tlement to a refund of taxes paid under pro-
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents seek an order of this Court affirming 
Judgment and Order of Permanent Injunction entered by the triai 
court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellants, in the opening brief, have set forth , 
statement of the facts which contains assertions unsupported b;· 
the record as a whole and which omits to state certain mater1a: 
facts relied on by the trial court in making its award of Judg-
ment. The following statement of facts is set forth to expli-
cate more fully and more accurately the record below. Specific 
note is made of appellants' assertions which are inconsistent 
with and unsupported by the record. 
1. The Parties. 
Respondent Utah Taxpayers Association, Inc. is a non-
profit co rpor at ion organized under the laws of the state of 
Utah, and having as its membership in Salt Lake City approxi-
mately 415 businesses and 290 individuals who are propert;· 
owners and taxpayers in salt Lake City. The individual narnec 
respondents are residents of salt Lake City or County, who a:' 
property owners and taxpayers in salt Lake City. 
additionally include various business entities organized '111 '1' 
the laws of the State of Utah, which own property and pay ta.If 
in Salt Lake City. (Complaint at R. 96-97). 
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,c,ppellant salt Lake City School District (hereinafter 
rhe •::<_hool u1slr1ct") is a body politic existing pursuant to 
the la.ws of the State of Utah and the appellant Board of Educa-
tion of Salt Lake City (hereinafter the •school Board") is its 
9ovetning body. The individual named appellants are officers, 
members or agents of the Board of Education of the Salt Lake 
District. (Complaint at R. 97). 
2, The Statutory Undistributed Reserve • 
.section 53-20-2 authorizes Utah school districts to 
maintain in their budgets an •undistributed reserve• (herein-
after the •statutory undistributed reserve•). The statute fur-
ther provides, however, that this reserve "shall not exceed 5% 
of the maintenance and operation budget adopted by the Board of 
Educatiun in accordance with the scale developed by the State 
Board of Education based upon the size of the budget of the 
O'.cliool district,• Utah Code Ann. § 53-20-2 ( 1982). In accor-
dance with the reserve policy established by the State Board of 
Erlucatrnn, the School oistr ict was permitted to maintain an 
·_:r.ri 1.str1l:•Jt<cd reserve not to exceed 1.5% of its maintenance and 
t_,,j(Jgel during all times material to this action. 
-. i " ; • 12) • 
: .- r, ci l year 1976-77 and continuing through fiscal 
/:- l q rJ l 2' appellants adopted budgets for the School 
' 1 •:: ·_-,n: a1ning undistributed reserves as provided by 
-3-
Section 53-20-2. (Findings at R. 468; see Plaintiffs' Ex.,· 
19, 21, 23 and 25). At no time during those fiscal years, ho;:-
ever, did appellants cause funds to be transferred from t!-
undistributed reserve to meet unexpected contingency expendi· 
tu res. (Findings at R. 468-69; Olsen Aff. at R. 360-61). 
3. The Line Item Reserve. 
In each fiscal year beginning 1976-77 through 1981-81, 
appellants adopted budgets for the School District containing; 
reserve separate and apart from the statutory undistributec 
reserve. This reserve was included in the School District's 
annual budgets as a line item and was designated as follows: 
Year Acct. NO. & Name Bud9eted Amount 
1976-77 0210.08 Salaries-Reserves-Teachers $1, 820,82; 
1977-78 0219.99 Salaries-Reserve $1,646,6\i 
1978-79 0219.99 Salaries-Reserve $2, 617,691 
1979-80 0219. 99 Salaries-Unallocated $1, 776,%1 
1980-81 021'1.99 Salaries-Other Expenses $3, 120,400 
1981-82 0210.99 Salaries-Other Expenditures $2, 774,7],, 
(Findings at R. 469; Plaintiffs' Exs. 16, 17, 19, 21, 23, ano 
25; these line items will hereinafter be referred to as the 
"line item reserve" to distinguish them from the statuton 
reserve permitted by Utah Code Ann. § 53-20-2 (1982)). 
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u,ning 1ts existence, the line item reserve was used 
by the .":h'}ol IJ1strict to meet unexpected contingency expendi-
iLlres nut provided tor by specific accounts in the School 
[Hstrict's budget. (Findings at R. 469). Specifically, the 
line i tern reserve was used to cover such varying contingencies 
as increased electricity and fuel costs, school outings, stu-
dent body activities, school supplies, retirement, insurance, 
garbage collection, professional meetings, grounds maintenance 
and legal services. (See Harmer Aff., Exs. D, E, F, and G at 
R. 243-S8). 
All funds not expended from the line item reserve were 
annually included in the School District's total maintenance 
and operation year-end fund balance. 1 (See Olson Aff. at 
R, For fiscal year 1977-78, $1,646.650 was 
originally budgeted for the line item reserve (Plaintiffs' Ex. 
llJ ana the School District's year-end fund balance was 
reported as $2,594,921. (Plaintiffs' Ex. 20). The School Dis-
11n t loe lt br1et, appellants have suggested that the 
Lty ot y•:ct r end balances is at issue. (See Appellants' 
Br 1 'C', "t b 71 Respondents have made no claim that fund 
LE.11 _-:!I), (;. r f'_t'__!'., :oe unlawtu 1. In the instant proceeding, how-
cVC, I ,ndt--':'nts submit that fund balances are probative of 
-Ji re· 1 _ . ' 11,.-, 1 t1re·nrtnce of an unlawful line item reserve. 
-5-
trict's 1978-79 budget included the line item reserve in t; 
amount of $2,617,691 (Plaintiffs' Ex. 11) and the Schor, 
District's maintenance and operation ending fund balance was 
reported as $3,919,3b2. (Plaintiffs' Ex. 20). For fiscal year 
1979-80, the line item reserve was budgeted at $1,776,%; 
(Plaintiffs' Ex. 11) and the School District's maintenance anc 
operation fund showed an ending balance of $4,571,294. (Plain· 
tiffs' Ex. 22). The School District budgeted $3,120,408 for 
the line item reserve in its 1980-81 budget (Plaintiffs' Ex. 
23) and ended the year with a fund balance of $2,173,885 in its 
maintenance and operation fund. (Plaintiffs' Ex. 24). For 
fiscal year 1981-82, $2,774,709 was budgeted for the line iter 
reserve (Plaintiffs' Ex. 25) and the School District ended that 
fiscal year with a total fund balance of $1,078,90j. 
(Plaintiffs' Ex. 26). 
Appellants, in their brief, have persisted in thell 
efforts to distinguish the line item reserve from the statuton 
undistributed reserve by asserting that the former was mere!, 
"an accounting method used by the District to facilitate hand· 
ling of uncertain revenues." (Appellants' Brief at SJ. Jn 
support of this assertion, appellants can muster only the 
deposition testimony ot Mr. w. Gary Harmer, 
District's Clerk-Treasurer. (_!Q..) 
Resort to the record below, as will be mo1e hi' 
explicated in the first point of argument herein, 
-6-
.n•• thP trldl court properly concluded that the line item 
rese• JP was employed by appellants as a funded contingency 
reserve, '>l!niltat in nature but in excess of the limitation 
l'Staol1shed l>y statute on the undistributed reserve. Mr. 
Harm,,r's own attidavit and accompanying exhibits indicate that 
tne line item reserves were annually utilized by the School 
District to meet a wide range of contingencies. (See Harmer 
P.fL Ex. D, E, F, and G at R. 243-58) • In addition, in candid 
. nscussions regarding the line item reserve at various School 
Board meetings between 1978 and 1981, Mr. Harmer and other 
board members indicated the line item at issue to be a funded 
reserve or surplus which, if unused, would revert 
year's budget. (See Plaintiffs' Memorandum at R. 
marnrn'oi pla1ntitts' exhibits)) Finally, 
to the next 
374-79 (sum-
the School 
District's budgets do not indicate the line item to have been 
cin untunued account designed to allow for variations in antici-
pated revenues but rather treat the line items at issue as 
tunoed expenoitures which are carried forward from year to year 
with the express purpose of covering contingencies. (See, 
Pla1nt11ts' Exs. 23 and 25). Thus, although appellants 
t'·ldeavur i11 tLcu statement ot tacts to define the line item 
c.11l pi existence by recharacterizing it as an unfunded 
; ,_fl.' y ap,j '-op r ia t ions accountu, appellants' claim is 
,l u1\1., lir the record. 
-7-
4. The Action and Trial. 
on July 24, 1981, respondents commenced this actiGr, 
against appellants, alleging that appellants, since fiscal Y"'' 
1976-77, had included within the budget for the School District 
an illegal line item reserve distinct from the statutory undis-
tributed reserve authorized by Utah Code Ann. § 53-20-i 
( 198 2). Respondents further alleged that appellants ha0 
included the illegal line item reserve in the School District's 
budget for fiscal year 1981-82, thereby increasing the properti 
tax revenues required to be levied to meet the School 
District's budget expenditures for that fiscal year. Respon-
dents accordingly sought injunctive relief to restrain appel-
lants from certifying to the Board of county Commissioners of 
Salt Lake County the property tax revenue amount as it appearea 
in the School District's 19 81-82 budget. 
2-19). 
(Complaint at R, 
The trial court issued a temporary restraining order, 
but, upon a hearing for a temporary injunction pending trial, 
the court dissolved the temporary restraining order and denied 
the temporary injunction. Because the case could not be sPt 
for trial prior to the deadline for the payment of their taxes, 
respondents paid their 19 81 Salt Lake County property 
under protest and amended their complaint to include a clal' 
for a refund of a portion of their taxes paid under protest 11' 
-8-
_;,_,nee w l r-_h Utah Code Ann. s 59-11-11 (Supp. 1979). 
1ne matter was tried on January 20, 1983. By stipula-
:,011 oc counsel, the trial court decided the case on the basis 
nf all submissions in the record, deposition transcripts, and 
exhibits. Based upon this evidence, 
2 the trial court found 
that apIJellants, from fiscal year 1976-77 through 1981-82, had 
adopted budgets for the School District containing a second and 
separate reserve to meet unexpected contingency expenditures in 
excess of the limitation established by Section 53-20-2. 
(Find l nq s at R • 4 6 7- 7 2) . The trial court therefore entered an 
order ot permanent inJunction, prohibiting appellants from 
aaoptrng a budget for the School District containing a reserve 
to meet unexpected contingency expenditures other than the 
statutor1 und1str1buted reserve and requiring it to utilize 
tunds from the statutory undistributed reserve to meet 
unexpected contingency expend1tures. (Judgment at R. 464-66). 
: 1 "nts have urged that the trial court "went outside 
rLlc' r "" making his determination in this case, pointing 
,,,_,, r·ourt's recollection of an Emery County schools 
.,, . c. wh1cri arose in connection with a Public Service 
... ,, ' ''" ['t rJceecJ inq. Even a cursory reading of the 
'L, '" <1• ate"- that the trial court's determination was 
"' -1" on that past incident. Further, the trial 
F [;,c.11nqs ot Fact and Conclusions of Law form the basis 
',_. f '''"! dee ts1on which is subject to appellate review, not 
(..:1 :_:,1,1111nns at the conclusion of trial. Wheat v. Denver 
1 fi 
'' __ _<_;si__., U2 Utah 418, 250 P.2d 932, 934 (1952). 
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The trial court expressly reserved for a later heanng 
question ot respondents' entitlement to tax refunds, pend 1• 
the disposition of this matter on appeal. 3 (Findings at 1. 
470; Tr. at R. 493-94). 
3Appellants have asserted that this action is imprope1 
because the two mill levies made by the School District rn 
separately authorized and that neither was illegal because tr.' 
School District allegedly experienced a shortfall for f1sca: 
year 1981-82. Because these claims are relevant only to th; 
issue of respondents' entitlement to a refund and because th;: 
issue was reserved by the trial court, these claims are nc: 
properly betore this Court. 
However, to preserve their rights, respondents subm1: 
that appellants have misconceived their taxing authority. 
Although the minimum school program mandatory levy and th1 
voted leeway canst i tute the maximum legal levy the Schoo. 
District may make, Utah Code Ann. § 53-7-9 (1982) permits; 
school board to certify for collection by means ot taxatio:. 
only "the amount of revenue required • to pay the cost o: 
the district's program in excess of the minimum school pro· 
gram." Id. This limitation is consistent with the gener<. 
rule that''public revenues be commensurate with public needs.' 
Plutus Mining Co. v. Orme, 76 Utah 286, 289 P. 132, lJH'. 
(1930). Appellants similarly ignore settled principles 11 
claiming that no retund may be made due to subsequent revenJr 
shortfalls and excess expenditures. In determining whethera: 
levy is excessive, a court must look to the facts existing · 
the time ot the levy and not subsequent events. 84 c.J.o. 
Taxation § 361 (1954). Although appellants suggest th.at . 
reduction of their levy might have caused the School DisUP 
to incur an illegal deficit, the provision relied on by aPP'' 
lants does not bar school districts from incurring cietictt' 
but only precludes their adoption of a budget 
deficit. See Utah Code Ann. § 53-20-2 (1982). 
-10- .. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THc TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THE LINE ITEM AT ISSUE 
TO CONSTITUTE A RESERVE FOR 
CONTINGENCIES IN EXCESS OF THE LIMITATIONS 
IMPOSED BY SECTION 53-20-2. 
In reviewing a trial court's findings, this Court will 
not substitute its own judgment for that of the trial court. 
Hldden Meadows Development Co. v. Mills, 590 P.2d 1244, 1250 
(Utah 1979). Rather, this court 
must consider all evidence in the light most 
favorable to the trial court's findings of 
fact. Those findings are entitled to a pre-
sumption of correctness and may not be over-
turned so long as they are supported by sub-
stantial evidence in the record. 
P1ac1 telli v. Southern Utah State College, 636 P.2d 1063, 1067 
!Utah 1981). 
Appellants submit that the trial court erred in con-
eluding that the line item at issue constituted a reserve for 
cu11t Lngenc1es similar to that authorized and limited by Section 
Assuming that this court might uphold the trial 
court's finding, appellants next assert that the statute should 
cunsl,u 0 0 to render that reserve exclusive. 
Tn 1,.r·0rt of their initial claim, appellants seek to 
,.,,.r, tr,e itne item reserve from the statutory undistri-
' I ·!aiming the line item merely to have been an 
"•· 1 ''• •used by the District to facilitate handling 
_, t _;;i .• (see Appellants' Brief at 5). Unlike 
-11-
of uncertain revenues." (See Appellants' Brief at 5). 1ir,!,, 
the statutory undistributed reserve which is a funded re.sere 
appellants allege the line item reserve to have constitut, 
only an accounting device enabling the School District to [lh 
for uncertain revenues with the optimistic assumption that the: 
would ultimately materialize. 
The trial court, however, rejected appellant;' 
characterization of the line item at issue upon a review of ti,, 
evidence adduced for trial. Specifically, the trial co'Jr 
found: 
Each fiscal year from fiscal year 1976-77 
through 1981-82, defendants have adopted a 
budyet for the Salt Lake City School 
District containing a reserve, which reserve 
has been used to meet unexpected contingency 
expenditures not otherwise provided for by 
specitic accounts in the budget of the Salt 
Lake City School District, which reserve has 
been in addition to that reserve authorized 
by Section 53-20-2, Utah Code Ann., and 
which reserve has been codified in the bud-
get of the Salt Lake City School District in 
the maintenance and operation fund under the 
instructional category. 
(Findings at R. 469). Thus, the trial court concluded that t:,' 
line item, in fact, constituted a funded reserve for 
gencies and not merely an accounting method. 
Appellants, in reasserting their claim that the 
i tern at issue was not a funded reserve, can claim for SUl'f'
1 
only the deposition testimony of Mr. w. Gary Harmer, the ,)cl" 
District's Clerk Treasurer and a defendant in this "'
11 
Resort to the record as a whole clearly indicates that the 
1
' 
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, 'cm'' "'''' c intended to function as a reserve to meet cont in-
Th21t th>= reserves were funded is further evident from 
; ,j '·''"'t appellants annually anticipated the unexpended 
portions 0t the line items to revert to the year-end balance of 
the Schn0l District's maintenance and operations budget. 
Appellants cannot dispute that the line item reserves 
were utilized to cover contingencies and def icienc1es in other 
line items, Mr. Harmer's own affidavit testimony and accom-
panying exhibits indicate that appellants employed the reserves 
to meec numerous contingencies, susceptible to no uniform 
class it ication. (See Harmer Aff., Exs. D, E, F and G at R. 
243-58). Notwithstanding the suggestions in appellants' brief, 
those expenditures generally were not for contract salaries or 
for services normally funded by categorical grants. (See 
S19niiicantly, appellants have not and cannot explain 
away the candid admissions of members of the School Board and 
statt relJarding the line item reserve which were relied 
upon by the trial court in making his finding. In a June 20, 
h 7 k meet J ng ot the School Board, Mr. Harmer explained the 
:·,_,01 u1 st r Let's procedure tor the maintenance of the line 
i l._J [ >- t Mr. Boren made reference to that 
fart earlier in this teacher 
salary account difference. And 
the thing that causes that var-
iance that he was referring to 
there is the fund balance which we 
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had budgeted but had not spent and 
in one year, it was in the ori-
ginal budget but not in the 
revised budget because it pulled 
out then and comes out in the end-
ing fund balance and there is a 
chunk of one-time money there that 
we have not spent. We have been 
reluctant to build into pro-
grams. 
{Plaintiffs' Ex. 7). In other words, the School District main· 
tained the reserve by listing it as a expenditure in its annuo'. 
original budget, adopted in June, and then pulled out all unex· 
pended funds from its revised budget, pre pa red subsequent!; 
during the fiscal year, placing those funds in its year-en; 
fund balance. The purpose underlying the maintenance of tr.e 
reserve account was succinctly stated by Board member Johr. 
Crawford: 
Mr. Crawford: When I came to this Board, the 
School Board was in a terrible 
financial condition. One of 
the purposes I have firmly set 
myself to as long as I sit on the 
Board is that this School District 
will never again run in a position 
where they were in violation of 
tne law because we were not 
operating this District in a . 
a manner where we could provide 
the necessary educational oppor-
tunities. One of the ways 
of doing that is make sure that 
build into the budget some reserve 
to take care of unexpected happen-
ings or in the time when things 
would happen our special programs 
would be needed that we could take 
care of that. 
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1t the beginning of the 1978-79 fiscal year, the 
srhoo I f\oarn cun'oidered reducing its mill levy. The discus-
w\'i<.'h 1ens11ed concerning this possibility shed further 
lighl on the line item reserve. In a July 12, 1978 memorandum 
prl'pated for the Board, Mr. Harmer discussed the Board's 
ortions: 
If the budget projections are accurate, we 
will end 1978-79 with an accumulated fund 
balance of $2,596,300. A one-mill reduction 
in the levy would reduce this amount by 
$771,428, assuming that 98% of the taxes 
assessed will be collected. If the Board 
adopts this alternative, the District would 
end 1978-79 with an accumulated fund balance 
of $1,824,872. 
!Plaintiffs' Ex. 1). The year-end balance projected by Mr. 
Harm"r closely approximates the $2,617,691 line item reserve 
budgeted for fiscal year 1978-79. (see Plaintiffs' Ex. 11). 
That Mr. Harmer spoke with some certainty with respect to the 
ant1c1pated year-end fund balance clearly belies any claim that 
the line item was a mechanism for budgeting uncertain 
<01en11es. Father, the revenues were deemed to be available for 
Schoel n1strict's use and were not tentatively allocated to 
'-'tl1•-.: r J 1 fJE 1 r µrr1s. 
tL•: ·,,,r,clus1on is strengthened by the discussion at 
i" 1 y 18, 1978 meeting where the memorandum was pre-
d l liat meeting, superintendent M. Donald Thomas 
.·cl· •I 1·] he recommendation on the alternatives that Gary 
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is recommending is the one mill reduction which would reduc· 
the fund balance and that would not cut out any programs and 
now if they went beyond that they would have to cut into p(o-
grams.• (Plaintiffs' Ex. 8). Later in that same meeting, the 
line item reserve was discussed by Board member M. Richar: 
Maxfield and Mr. Harmer: 
Maxfield: 
Harmer: 
Maxfield: 
Harmer: 
Thomas: 
Harmer: 
Maxfield: 
One other item. Gary can best 
answer this but, we have a fund 
balance in instruction. It is my 
understanding, that the guidelines 
suggest having that in a line item 
undistributed reserve. Is there a 
reason we don't use that parti-
cular classification rather than 
confusing the issue by putting it 
in instruction? 
Well, we have an undistributed 
reserve and always have had, but 
if you have ••. we only have two 
choices really, and that is, put 
it in instruction or put it in 
somewhere or build into programs. 
Build, • • • plan to spend it. 
You don't, it is just a matter of, 
taking, there is no other way to 
handle it • • You can't put any 
more into und1str ibuted reserve 
than what we have in undistributed 
reserve. 
Oh, you can't? 
No. 
We have a maximum. 
We are not quite, we are not •. · 
I thought there was a guideline 
but no maximum. 
-16-
Ha L 
Maxfield: 
Harmer: 
No, there is a maximum, and well, 
we are maybe, likely could go 
$50,000 higher or something like 
that. our budget, the maximum is 
of your total budget, we are 
underneath 5% right now, but only 
about $50,000, or something like 
that. Undistributed reserve is no 
answer as far as having that fund 
balance. 
No, it is just that 
clarifies for someone who 
know that looks at the 
would be confused with that. 
matter 
doesn't 
budget 
Of course we have only had this, 
we have had this for about the 
last, we had started building this 
here about five years ago, four 
years ago and each year it has 
been in the same place. The only 
pr ob lem is that when you compare, 
like if you compare next year's 
budget to this year's actual 
expenditures, that distorts it, 
the amount that we don't really 
plan to spend. 
I Id. (emphasis added)). 
The line item was recognized by the School Board and 
its si:aff to constitute a reserve whose funds, if unexpended, 
wuuld be carried forward to the next fiscal year. Further, 
tflis wa:o placed in the instructional budget, since 
opp,- 1 '-':Is d'<nqni zed that it could not be included in the 
'".:_Q1 11: ' ""·listriuuled reserve without violating the limita-
; )1111' It cannot credibly be claimed that the 
lir:p 11, ni at was unfunded; the statements of the School 
n1<"'mbPt" and 1 ts staff indicate that appellants felt no 
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uncertainty whatsoever that revenues were available to exper. 
funds from the line item should the need arise. 
In a May 15, 1979, meeting of the School Board, fGr 
example, Mr. Harmer again addressed the line item at issue: 
The balance of it is budgeted in next year's 
budget. It would be my opinion that we 
would, could possibly end next year with 
$1.7 million of that left over. 
(Plaintiffs' Ex. 9). This projected surplus of $1. 7 millior. 
again is consistent with the amount budgeted for the line 1tei 
reserve for fiscal year 1979-80, $1,776,961. (see Plaintiffs' 
Ex. 11). 
Similarly, in a letter dated July 17, 1981, ther. 
School Board Member Wayne Evans stated: 
[A]s part of our budget for 1981-82, we are 
currently projecting a surplus of $2.774 
million. 
As you see, we do feel the need to maintain 
a reserve, but we are trying to whittle it 
down so that it will eventually fall in the 
$1.5 to 2.0 million range. 
( P 1 a inti ff s' Ex . 4) • The •surplus• or •reserve• identified b; 
Mr. Evans again corresponds closely to the line item reserve 
budgeted for the 1981-82 fiscal year, $2,774,709. (see pJa1n-
tiffs' Ex. 25). That budgeted amount was again addressed 1
n a 
June 16, 1981 public hearing on the adoption of the 1981-t 
fiscal year budget. During that meeting, the 
f 0 l lfJl,,' I 'I 
exchange between Board Member Tab Uno and Mr. Harmer occurre.J: 
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i' !_ !1-l.U: 
'_JI:"'; J 
1 Hn (lileL J 
Where is 210.99 in terms ot the 
or1g1nal tentative budget? 
lt shows an estimated budget which is 
<:Jone from the previous year. In the 
revised budget we also clear that out 
and it goes back to fund balance. You 
have to handle this as an expenditure 
and the contingency reserve is the only 
reserve you have. 
il'laint1ffs 1 Ex. 3). 
ln sum, the evidence adduced for trial clearly dispels 
any illusion that the line item at issue was merely an account-
ing device intended to facilitate the budgeting of uncertain 
revenues. The School Board and its staff viewed the line item 
to be a funded reserve account available for contingencies and 
whose surplus would carry over to each new fiscal year. 4 
4The aisingenuousness of appellants' characterization of 
the I me i tern reserve is evident in appellants' claim that 
atfumance ot the trial court will result in a reduction of 
thdt :>chool District's bond rating. If the line item at issue 
merely constituted an accounting device and did not represent a 
tunde<J reserve, its discontinuance could not provide the basis 
fen a r eduL·t1on in the School District's rating. That 
appEI iant'. ·"ite concerned that their rating may be affected 
'nu1r ... 1 ec> ti1at tl1e trial court properly concluded the line item 
esurvp tu be funded. 
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The evidence in the record further indicates that appellar, 
recognized this reserve account to be distinct from the stac,-
tory undistributed reserve, limited to 1.5% of the Sehr,: 
District's maintenance and operations budget. The reccr, 
alone, therefore, militates for an affirmance of the tria' 
court's finding that the line item at issue as a contrngeri,; 
reserve. 
I I. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT THE SCHOOL 
DISTRICT'S MAINTENANCE OF THE LINE ITEM CONTRAVENED 
THE BUDGETARY PROCEDURES PRESCRIBED BY 
SECTION 53-20-2. 
A. The Legislative History of Section 53-20-2 an: 
that: 
Cardinal Rules of Statutory Construction support tt' 
Trial Court's Ruling. 
Utah Code Ann. S 53-20-2 provides, in pertinent pw, 
The district shall be authorized to adopt a 
budget containing an amount known as the 
undistributed reserve. This reserve shall 
not exceed 5% of the maintenance and opera-
tion budget adopted by the Board of Educa-
tion in accordance with a scale developed by 
the State Board of Education based upon the 
size of the budget of the school district. 
Appropriations may be made from the undis-
tributed reserve to an expenditure classif i-
cation in the maintenance and operation 
budget of the district by resolution adopted 
by a majority vote of the Board of Education 
setting forth the reasons for the 
appropriations of the reserve or any portion 
thereof and filed with the state Board 
Education and the state Audi tor. The 
undistributed reserves may not be used in 
negotiation or settlement of contract 
salaries for school d1str1ct employees. 
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Ba 0;Pd upon that statutory provision, the trial court 
conrl 1, ,I Pei: 
Defendants may, pursuant to Section 53-20-2 
Utah code Ann., adopt a budget for the salt 
Lake City School District containing an 
amount known as the undistributed reserve 
for unexpected contingency expenditures not 
otherwise provided for by specific accounts 
in the budget. 
Defendants are limited to including in the 
budget of the Salt Lake City School District 
as a reserve to meet unexpected contingency 
expenditures not otherwise provided for by 
specific accounts in the budget only that 
undistributed reserve provided for in 
Section 53-20-2, Utah Code Ann. 
Defendants have exceeded their statutory 
authority in adopting from fiscal years 
1976-77 through 1981-82 budgets for the salt 
Lake school District containing a reserve 
which has been used to meet unexpected con-
tingency expenditures not otherwise provided 
for by specific accounts in the budget and 
which reserve has been in addition to that 
reserve authorized by Section 53-20-2, Utah 
Code Ann. 
iFindings at R. 470-71.) 
urge that the trial court erred in con-
scr·1111g the statute to preclude the School District's main-
·: f t r.e l 1ne i tern reserve, asserting that neither the 
le" slat 1 ve history nor its express terms bar the 
uf an add1 t ional reserve to meet contingencies not 
· ·lcod for by specific accounts. Reference to the 
•u,,.·i .. history and application of cardinal rules of 
i U\ 1 UJl..:; [Ur:;t 10fl, hOWeVe[ 1 Vitiate this Claim. 
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Discussions in the Utah State Senate prior to t,,, 
measure's enactment indicate that its proponents desired. 
provide some mechanism within school district budgets to me,, 
contingencies. Sena tor MacFa r lane, who co-sponsored one of tr'" 
bills containing the enactment, stated: 
The reason I guess Senator Preece is just 
that sometimes emergencies arise, conditions 
arise which cannot be predicted far ahead of 
time. I just think of our district for 
example not too long ago • • • We had two 
boilers go out in the district. This 
meant that they had to take money from other 
sources of the budget and put it into this 
M+O fund. • Also • • there have been 
cases in the state in the not too far past 
where they have been epidemics hit districts 
and they have been in real financial trouble 
because of the average daily attendance then 
dropping down and of course they have appro-
priated the money on the basis of that. 
* * * * * * * 
Now budgets of course you know school 
district's budgets are prepared in May or 
earlier - they have to be subject to a pub-
lic hearing in June usually and then they 
are for the next year's expenditures and at 
this time a lot of things such as the set 
valuation for the district are not com-
pletely determined, the amount of federal 
assistance many times is not determined at 
that point, in fact, the funding sometimes 
takes place several months later and the 
fluctations that are possible such as atten-
dance you know they receive the revenue 
based on the average daily attendance and if 
there is an epidemic that hits a district 
then average daily attendance can drop 
significantly and that can mean a signifi-
cant drop of revenue and so they need to 
carry a reserve to meet such circumstances 
as that. 
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r 1 a i (1 i 1_ t ts• Ex. 13) Senator MacFarlane's comments indicate 
1-hat 1 !12 measure was intended both to protect school districts 
from unant1cipated budget expenditures as well as unanticipated 
tevenue st1orttalls. This purpose was accomplished by permit-
ting the districts to maintain an account, denominated the 
"undistributed reserve", which constituted an exception to the 
general budgeting rule that requires detailed revenue and 
expenu1ture listings. 
The Senate discussion of the bill, however, suggests 
that an additional purpose was intended by the legislature in 
enacting the measure. Senator MacFarlane further stated: 
( ld - J 
[T]hese budgets have to be built 
early, and so I am sure that school district 
budget builders tend to pad each budget item 
a little bit just in the event they do have 
an emergency comes up. They have no other 
recourse but to do that. So, having this 
reserve I think puts everything again on a 
gooa budgeting procedure; its over and above 
board; its out where it can be looked 
"t; . and it does make sound business 
practice. 
Thus, the enactment served the additional purpose of 
testuciny yood budgeting practices to school districts by esta-
1-11bn1ny '"'' alternative to budget "padding" and by rendering a 
- {.,,, ·, 
1i1'-l-(1' t's reserves subject to public scrutiny. Cer-
,_ 112 1 ecpslature, which sought to ameliorate the practice 
wauu1ny by the enactment of this measure, would not 
'"
1"l'.''""'-'° the inflation of a school district's budget by the 
"'"'nu"""' e nf a deceptive line item reserve. 
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Appellants' reliance upon the statements of Mr. Harn,. 
regarding the legislature's intent is misplaced. Although Mr. 
Harmer may have participated in the drafting the measure ar. 
may have lobbied for its enactment, his affidavit testimor,, 
obtained ten years after the measure's enactment, is entitl'. 
to no weight. It is well settled that statements by a leg 1,. 
lator after the enactment of a statute are entitled to litt1-
or no weight at all. Epstien v. Resor, 296 F. Supp. li,, 
216 (N.D. Cal. 1969); Union Oil Co. of California v. Departmer,: 
of Revenue, 560 P.2d 21, 24 n. 9; (Alaska 1977); Hand v. Stat. 
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 2 Kan. App. 253, 577 Y ... 
1202, 1205 (Kan. Ct. App. 1978). Certainly the subsequer.-
statements of an individual not even a member of the legis!;-
tive body are entitled to no more weight. 
The trial court's construction of the statute adoi 
tionally is supported by accepted rules of statutory construe-
tion. It is generally accepted that, in construing a statct' 
a legislature will not be presumed to have done a useless act. 
See, Walker v. Nation Wide Financial Corp. of Idaho, !· 
Idaho 266, 629 P. 2d 662, 664 (1981); Thompson v. IDS_J::___ 
Insurance Co., 549 P. 2d 510, 513 (Or. 1976); 
Insurance Co. v. Guaranty National Insurance Co., 97 wash-
139, 641 P.2d 173 (1982) Appellants' construction ot r:-
statute, permitting school districts to maintain reserves wir: 
out limitation to meet unanticipated revenue shortfalls 
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1_,_:n•HLc•re::,, would render meaningless the section's express 
i1rn1t:.at:on provision. 
Similarly, the rules of statutory construction provide 
that the inclusion of an authorization excludes any similar 
unauthorized act, as is expressed in the maxim "expressio unius 
est exclus10 alterius". In Rio Grand Motor Way, Inc. v. Public 
Service Commission, 21 Utah 2d 377, 445 P.2d 990 (1968), this 
Court recognized the utility of that rule, stating: 
Whether it is helptul and understanding the 
intended effect of a statute depends upon 
tne analysis ot the legislative enactment to 
which it is sought to be applied. 
lo. at 9':!2. In the instant case, where it is evident that the 
legislature intendea to authorize the inclusion of an undistri-
1>uter1 statutory reserve in school district budgets where no 
such reserve had previously existed, where the legislature 
J "cer1Jed to avoid budget "padding" and to facilitate public 
scrnt rn1 ot the reserve, the maxim is clearly applicable and 
usetul 1 r1 interpreting the effect of the statute. The statute 
school district to establish one reserve for contin-
t ,_,t112rwise provided for by specific line items, but 
11"' Tt J c11 Court's Construction ot Section 53-20-2 
, -11_ l 1 si1ees a Proper Basis for Distinguishing Between 
l'e(,n-i sc,1ble and Impermissible Reserves. 
assert that the trial court erred in 
•1'"' '''"'line item reserve unlawful, claiming that reserve 
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to be indistinguishable from permissible reserves. (:,, 
Appellants' Brief at 32-34). In support of this asserti0r1, 
appellants quote the trial court out of context and attempt t: 
misconstrue the clear import of his ruling. In rendering h:: 
oral decision, the court stated: 
The striking thing to the Court in terms of 
the account that we are talking about is 
that even those that are specified by 
statute, namely the reserve for inventory 
and the reserve for self-insurance, notwith-
standing the fact that they are not in the 
statute, they are not contingent kinds of 
items, as such, and they are identified kind 
of expenditures. You have got a specific 
mandate under the statute to perform this 
function in the public sense and in the 
light ot the public eye. And in the context 
of those two accounts you have identified 
specifically what those expenditures are, 
whereas, on the other hand, the Account 
0200, with the Subaccount 0210.99, other 
expenditures, you haven't identified any-
thing as to what the purpose of that account 
is. Other than in the pleadings and deposi-
tion and responses, that you recognize that 
that simply is to take care of unidentified 
contingencies. But there are specific 
accounts to take care of salaries, take care 
of snow removal, take care of any number of 
things which you have identified, and even 
though we have maybe a general perception of 
the weather not being perdictable, the U.S. 
Weather Service does make long-range predic-
tions and tells us whether we are going to 
have a hard winter or whatever, and that 
gives some reliability. 
(Tr. at R. 488-89 (emphasis added)). 
The trial court's remarks clearly indicate thal tr 
distinction between appellants' impermissible line item resel' 
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tt1e perm1ss1ble reserves is based on the specificity with 
.1.i·;h the purposes of the reserve are identified and the 
corresponding susceptibility of the reserve to public scru-
tiny. Wloile the use of any reserve, by its very nature, will 
rest upon contingencies, the ease with which a reserve may be 
subjected to public oversight will vary depending upon the suf-
f1ciency of the identification provided the reserve. Where a 
reserve is established as a vaguely denominated line item and 
is intended to be utilized to meet any and all contingencies 
which may arise in a school district's budget, that reserve 
wiil be subject to little if any supervision. The Utah Legis-
lature therefore has authorized the maintenance of only one 
undistributed reserve and has established limitations on the 
same. 
C. The Trial Court's Construction of Section 53-20-2 does 
not Ignore the Limitations Established in That Statute. 
Appellants further cannot predicate a claim of error 
)n th" trial court's construction of the provision that the 
undistributed reserve •may not be used in negotiation or 
settleme"! of contract salaries for school district 
Utah code Ann. § 53-20-2 (1982). Appellants sub-
!Ii J t l_ h F; i : f 1 _ I r inP item reserve is permissible because the 
severely restricts the use of the statutory 
' 101 str1bu:;::=t3 reserve. In essence, appellants claim that no 
l'uiids "'-" t_•E expPnded from the statutory reserve which might be 
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deemed to be in payment of teachers' contract salaries. Eve: 
assuming appellants' construction of the limitation to be tru', 
it is unclear why the presence of that limitation on the statu-
tory reserve would necessarily require a determination that a 
second similar, but unlimited, reserve should be found permis-
sible. 
The plain language of the statute and its legislative 
history, however, provide no basis whatsoever for appellants' 
construction of the limitation. The trial court utterly 
rejected that construction, stating: 
It appears that the language of the statute 
about wages is reasonably clear in its con-
text to relate to the labor negotiating pro-
cess, and its talking about settlements of 
con tr act negotiations and settlement of the 
contract, once that is arrived at, salaries 
ordinarily might be one of the more perdict-
able kind of i terns in a budget. And once 
that has been determined then it seems to 
the court that you are not going back and 
dipping into a fund that the legislature has 
put beyond the reach of the Board, then you 
are utilizing it for contingencies in a 
salary area, sickness, or any number of 
things, and that account would certainly be 
available to cover those contingencies. 
(Tr. at R. 491). That construction of the limitation is sup-
ported by the plain language of the statute which merely bars 
the use of the undistributed reserve when a school d1stric' 
negotiates with its teachers or their bargaining unit to e't'" 
blish compens9tion for the ensuing school year. The statute, 
on its face, does not proscribe the use of the reserve to 111"
1
'" 
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• 
"'"'Xl'"''s.i for sick leave, payments to substitute 
Leacr1cr s e>>: rd her contingencies which may arise during the 
school y.oar. 
D. of the State 
Third-Parties Do Not Render 
Budgetary Practices. 
Superintendent and Other 
Legal Appellants' Illegal 
Appellants would have this Court believe that the 
determination of the trial court should be set aside, because 
ap[.>ellants' budgeting procedures have the approval of the 
Superintendent of Public Instruction, national organizations 
and tne School District's accountants. The conclusory state-
ment of the Superintendent approving of the School District's 
"handling ot fund balances and undistributed reserves" provides 
absolutely no guidance in this action; the statement on its 
utterly fails to provide any basis for the Superinten-
dent's opinion and flies in the face of Section 53-20-2's 
leg1sldt1ve history and purpose. 
Al thouyh this Court has adhered to the proposition 
that the construction of statutes by governmental agencies 
charged w1tn their administration should be given weight, the 
••)UJT has i"rther cautioned that "if it is made clearly to 
., -:t.atute has been misconstrued or misapplied it is 
11.c " ttie Court to correct the same." McPhie v. Indus-
tt 1 
, IPllL I J !)(• P.2d 153, 155 (Utah 1977). Signifi-
t tic uv1s1ons which authorize the Superintendent to 
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render his opinions for the guidance of Utah school distrw 
expressly provide that interpretations of the Superintend;:, 
are subject to being set aside by a court of competent Juris-
dictions. see Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-4 (1982). 
Appellants' reliance on the awards the School Distric 
has ootained from national organizations for adhereing to "goo: 
accounting principles" and the annual statements of its accoun· 
tants manifests a complete misunderstanding of the nature c: 
the instant proceeding. At issue is not the question o: 
whether the budgetary procedures employed by appellants wer; 
advisable but rather whether those procedures, and specificaL 
the maintenance of the line item reserve, were in accordanc' 
with Utah law. Thus, the opinions of the national organiza· 
tions and appellants' accountants are completely irrelevant l! 
the instant proceeding. Those parties possess no authority le 
interpret the laws of this state and their sanction of appe.· 
!ants' budgetary procedures is of no probative value. 
Similarly, appellants' can claim no benefit from tr,, 
opinions of respondents' expert, Mr. Robert Goldsberry. 
review of Mr. Goldsoerry's deposition testimony, including the' 
quoted by appellants in their brief, indicates that 
Goldsberry did not waiver from his conclusion that appellant: 
use of the line item reserve exceeded the authority given un'
1
' 
Section 53-20-2. (See Goldsberry Depo. at R. 309) · 
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I o,:t 'c Suhmi t that his further testimony Suggested that 
0 pµell21,-,-'" maintenance of a line item reserve was the only 
practicable means of dealing with contingencies within the bud-
this assertion again utterly ignores the fact that the 
issue rn this proceeding is not the advisability of the bud-
getary procedure but its legality. Mr. Goldsbery certainly did 
not assume the role of a judge in this case; he is an accoun-
tant. As suggested by the trial court in rendering its oral 
decision, if the maintenance of an undistributed reserve in a 
greater amount is necessary to meet contingencies, appellants 
need only request that the Superintendent increase the limita-
tion on the statutory reserve in accordance with his authority 
under the statute. (See Tr. at R. 495). 
In conclusion, both its legislative history and 
general rules of statutory construction support the trial 
court's conclusion that Section 53-20-2 prohibited appellants' 
ma1nt:enance of the line item reserve separate and apart from 
tr,e statutorj undistributed reserve. Although appellants have 
0 tteniµted tc; engender confusion by characterizing the case as 
c·r,,, cc)riceu111"" Lne relative merits of varying budgetary proce-
"tn ._ 1.;l court properly concluded that the true issue 
ot appellants' utilization of the line item 
'""!'"" l Lctnts have raised and substantiated no ground 
PL';1ny Lne trial court's determination. 
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III. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S GRANT OF PERMANENT 
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF CONSTITUTED AN APPHOPRIATE 
EXERCISE OF THE COUHT'S REMEDIAL POWERS. 
A. The Trial Court Committed no Error in the Issuance 
the Prohibiting Injunction. 
-
The trial court, having concluded that the budgeto:. 
procedures used by appellants exceeded the authority given U1e· 
by Section 53-20-2, entered judgment in favor of responden: 
and issued an order of permanent inJunction, prohibiting appe;· 
lants from adopting a budget containing "any reserve, howe'-''' 
designated, which serves to meet unexpected contingen:: 
expenditures not otherwise provided for by specific accounls :· 
the budget and which reserve is in addition to that reser:, 
autnor1zed by Section 53-20-2, Utah Code Ann." (Order at r 
465) • The trial court further entered a mandatory injunctior 
requiring appellants to utilize funds from the statutory undii 
tributed reserve to meet unexpected contingencies not other• 10' 
provided for by specitic budget accounts. (.!..2_. at 465-661 · 
Appellants do not claim that public officials may nc 
be enJoined wnere they are acting in excess of authority or 
violation of the law. That proposition is well settled. llJ.· 
State ex rel. Burger v. Myers, 495 P. 2d 844, 846 (Ariz. 191 : 
Hanson v. Mosser, 427 P.2d 97, 100 (Or. 1967). Instead, 
lants assert- that inJunctive relief is improper, becauoe 
constitutes an indirect effort to enJoin the School Distrl 
tax1ny authority and that the reliet "is meaningless" bec,·i· 
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:od1•JOJ 111strict's budget can be designed without the line 
; em r Appellants' Brief at 38-40) 
h.,s1s wriatsoever exists for the claim that the 
i nJ u11c1 l ,1e reliei awarded will intertere with the School 
's tax:1n<j authority. The injunctions, on their face, 
no limitations on that authority and no such limitations 
ran be implied from them. Rather, they are addressed merely to 
1 ne :Orhool D1str ict' s method ot accounting for and budgeting 
ror expenditures. The School District may levy all taxes 
permissible to meet its legitimate revenue needs 
notwithstanding the imposition of the two injunctions. 
That the School District's budget can be designed 
without the inclusion of the line item reserve both substan-
Llates 1espondents' claims that such reserves should not exist 
in ttie f tr st place and provides no basis for setting aside the 
lrtal cuurt 's proh1b1tory injunction. That injunction fulfills 
Jts essential purpose in precluding appellants from again esta-
item reserve in contravention of Section 
It theretore clearly cannot be deemed meaningless or 
tu failed ot its essential purpose. 
'Iii 
'' 3ssume that appellants, in making this 
•.n yoor1 ta1tn to comply with the prohibitory 
de '"'t mean to suggest that they will engage in 
"' rl.e11 buu9et as condemned by the legislature. 
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B. Mandatory Injunctive Relief Is Appropriate Where, 
Administrator's Exercise of Discretion is Limited, -
Appellants, relying on Tuttle v. Board of Education,, 
salt Lake City, 294 P.2d 294 (Utah 1930), assert that the tria. 
court erred in granting mandatory injunctive relief, becaui• 
"mandate ordinarily will not compel the performance of [a dis 
cretionary act] in a particular way or manner.• (Appellants' 
Brief at 41 (quoting Tuttle v. Board of Education of Salt La1,s 
City, 294 P.2d 294, 300 (Utah 1930)). The Tuttle case, 
ever, is completely distinguishable from the instant proceedins, 
In Tuttle, the plaintiffs sought mandatory rnjunctrn 
relief to compel the school board to adopt a budget whw 
titles and accounts conformed precisely with those used in 
prior year's budget. see id. at 295-97. In concluding tha'. 
mandamus would be an inappropriate remedy, the Court noted that 
The statute does not prescribe the kind of 
classification of titles and accounts to be 
made by the Boa rd, or how f u 11 and complete 
it is to be made, whether by only a general 
classification or to what extent the classi-
fication is required to descend to parti-
culars or details. The requirement of the 
statute in such particulars is that the 
classification shall be equivalent to the 
district's classification. But how or in 
what manner the district's classification is 
to be made, or how the classification is to 
be made to appear, or to be ascertained or 
determined, likewise is not prescribed. 
Id. at 300. Thus, the court's ruling in Tuttle rested upon': 
conclusion that the statute at issue 
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bO'" provided the school ' 
J"'" 1 ,,,, 1 11nfettered discretion in the determination of its 
rJ1Jd')Pt c1.1ss1f1cat1ons, titles and accounts. 
Wh1]P tt is well settled that mandamus may not issue 
i_r, conrpel a puhl ic official to act where that official is 
;,ffordPd unlimited discretion, the courts have long recognized 
an exception to that rule where limitations are imposed upon 
the exercise of discretion. With respect to this exception, 
the E1ghlh Circuit court of Appeals has stated: 
iJ I 
Ju' 
The rule is well settled and fully 
recognized by us that when discretion is 
conferred upon public agents or officers 
their acts in the lawful exercise of that 
discretion cannot be controlled by man-
damus. The rule is also well settled that, 
although the exercise of discretion will not 
be controlled by mandamus, yet the writ will 
lie to compel the person or body in whom the 
discretion is lodged to proceed to its exer-
cise. In view of these rules, we are of the 
opinion that the discretion that cannot be 
controlled by mandamus is that discretion, 
and that only, which the law has vested in 
the person to be exercised. If the law has 
pointed how or in what way the discretion 
shall be exercised, it is obviously not the 
exercise of the discretion imposed by a law 
to proceed in any other way. To so proceed 
would be contrary to the law and would be 
trE exercise of arbitrary power rather than 
rl1scrPtion. To decline or refuse to proceed 
"''-' 1 rcl1ng to law or in the way pointed out 
f,,, l31! is in our opinion equivalent to not 
l1ric1 at all. In other words, the dis-
""l whu:t1 will withstand review by the 
''! r' 0 rnrist be exercised under law and not 
to law. 
Hadley, 177 F. 1, 9 (8th Cir. 1910): see also 52 
,·u Mcif\1JalTIUS § 79 (1970). Thus, where limitations are 
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imposed upon the exercise of discretion or the manner of :. 
exercise is prescribed by statute, mandamus may issue. 
Section 53-20-2, as construed by the trial cow 
clearly restricts the discretion which may be exercised b
1 
school district in meeting unexpected contingencies not pr 
v ided for by a school district's budget. Where no spec1 1• 
line item reserves have been included in the budget, a scl10 
district is barred from maintaining general reserves other tr: 
the undistributed reserve to meet such contingencies. \: 
trial court, upon recognizing this limitation on a scho 
district's discretion, properly concluded that a manoatc: 
inJunction could issue to restrict the School District and:: 
employees from illegally utilizing other funds to meet sc: 
contingencies. In light of the School District's prior aoi,: 
of the budgetary process, the mandatory injunction was esse· 
tial to give eftect to the prohibitory injunction add1tiona: 
ordered by the trial court. 
C. The Cases Cited By Appellants Support the Tri.', 
Court's Order ot Permanent Injunction. 
Appellants submit that the trial court erred in inti 
feriny with its budgetary procedures, because this Court: 
frequently stated that no such interference is permissi 
absent a showiny that a school board has abused its disc'''. 
or violated the law. (See Appellants' Briet at 43-451 · 
ever, appellants' anuse of d1scret1on and actions exceedir,..J 
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, ,,_,,i'r'• 1 Jl"'" them under Section 53-20-2 having been clearly 
_ 'hEC.1, cases raised by appellants support the trial 
urJe1 of permanent injunction. 
'" bedrd v. Board of Education, 81 Utah 51, 16 P.2d 
'JUG :l0 ._,. chis Court stated: 
rtie courts will not interfere with the exer-
cise of discretion by school directors in 
matters contided by law to their judgment, 
unless there is a clear abuse of the discre-
tTon, or a violation of law. 
Id- at '.103 temphasis added). Significantly, in that case, the 
court observed that: 
The powers of the Board of Education are 
statutory since the legislature may author-
ize the governing authorities of school 
districts as the State's agent to do any-
thing not prohibited by the constitution. 
The Board of Education, being a creature of 
the legislature, has only such powers as are 
expressly conferred upon it and such implied 
powers as are necessary to execute and carry 
into etfect its expressed powers. 
Jd. !emphasis added). Where a school board acts in controven-
t1on of its statutory authority a court clearly may exercise 
lts 1emedial powers. 
S1m1larly, in Petty v. Utah State Board of Regents, 
P 1?9'! (Utah 1'!79), this Court observed: 
, Jn aam1nistrative agency should be allowed 
o ''"•Parative wide latitude of discretion in 
l'''Ju;-m_rrici its responsibilities and ••• 
·_! . .c ·out ts should not intrude or interfere 
Ll.c tt1 unless the action is so oppressive 
unreasonable that it must be deemed 
"""'and arbitrary, or the agency has 
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in some way acted contrary to law or in 
excess of its authority. 
at 1302 (emphasis added). In Petty, the Court conclud; 
that the Board of Regents possess statutory authority to asses 
a student fee as a part of a medical student's tuition an, 
accordingly rejected the plaintiff's challenge to that action, 
Here, however, appellants have acted in contravention of the:: 
statutory au th or i ty and accordingly a s imi la r result is not 
compelled. 
In Board of Education of Salt Lake City v. Burgen, 6. 
Utah 162, 217 P. 1112 (1923), no question of the legality c' 
the school board's budgetary procedures was raised. Accor,;-
ingly, that case is inapposite to the instant matter. The cas; 
merely stands for the proposition that, between the schoo. 
board and the county commissioners, the school board possese: 
the authority to determine the amount of its revenues to be 
raised so long as the limitation on the maximum mill levy J! 
not exceeded. Nothing therein can be viewed as barnng tk 
trial court's order of permanent injunction. 
D. Assertions Regarding the school District's 
ing Provide no Basis for Reversing the Trial court. 
Appellants have reasserted their claim that the credi' 
or bond rating of the school District wil 1 go down 1 f th'· 
Court sustains the ruling of the trial court. Appellants, r1'
1
' 
ever, have adduced no competent evidence to substantiate tlil 
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-
,, , "', c<esu, t lo the record below indicates that this asser-
tion L pre<JJc-ated exclusively on hearsay contained in the 
afficla'-'i t ct Mr. Harmer and the trial court properly chose not 
to issue a dec1s1on based on it. Certainly the claim cannot be 
evidenced or supported by the mere assertions of counsel for 
ap['ellants in their brief. See Watkins v. Simonds, 14 Utah 2d 
406, 385 P.2d 154, 155 (1963). 
i:.ven if competent evidence had been adduced to sub-
stantiate this claim, no rational basis exists for finding it 
crea1ble. The trial court found that: 
It is doubtful that the bond rating of the 
Salt Lake City School District will be 
affected because of the fact that the school 
district cannot maintain, as a separate 
account a reserve to meet unexpected contin-
yency expenditures not otherwise provided 
for by specific accounts in the budget since 
detendants aaopt in the budget of the Salt 
Lake City School District a reserve for such 
unexJ,Jec ted contingency expenditures as pro-
v 1ded by Section 53-20-2 Utah Code Ann. 
iFrncllngs at R. 469-70). As further noted by the trial court 
"' reriaer J_ny his oral decision, if the School District's bond 
rdc1ny wi11 be adversely effected because of the unavailability 
n a ieserve, the School District's recourse is to 
the limitation on its statutory undistributed 
, '· .r<-cJsed by the Superintendent. (Tr. at R. 495). 
cc!'' "l-'tJPllants' claim that the line item reserve did 
- l" <-Se«t tunds available to the School District but merely 
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was an accounting device for contingent revenues, it is dttf 
cult to conceive that its financial position can be deemeo 
have deteriorated by the mere discontinuance of that account;· 
device. The two positions are irreconcilable. 
Further, appellants' assertions regarding the Scho'. 
District's bond rating are immaterial in this proceeding. Tl., 
case involves a legal and not an equitable action. It tn1 
Court affirms the trial court, the School District must char> 
its procedures regardless of the effect on its bond ratrn,. 
The School District is bound by the laws of this State 
not circumvent them merely to satisfy bond rating services. 
CONCLUSION 
Substantial evidence appearing in the record cornpe.: 
the conclusion that the trial court properly found that 
lants, beginning fiscal year 1976-77 and continuing throu: 
1981-82, maintained a line item reserve similar to, but 
addition to, the undistributed reserve authorized by Sect!'" 
53-20-2. The plain language of the statute itselt, bolstw·. 
by its legislative history and carainal rules of statutory cc 
struction, support the trial court's conclusion that the 5'; 
tion precludes appellants from including in the Sen 
District's budget a reserve, other than the statutory und,st: 
buted reserve, to meet unexpected contingency expenditures r· 
otherwise provided for by specific accounts in the budget 
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,,,,,,u[<o thal the Jegislature's stated purpose of promoting good 
procedures and facilitating public oversight of the 
1 .. ,,,:,,.1 ,n'i process is effected, this Court should affirm the 
tria; crrnrt 's JUdyment and its order of injunctive relief. 
DATl:.Ll this ,C{;JL day of August, 1983. 
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